In a previous article, we highlighted a flaw in the average credit quality statistic frequently reported by bond mutual funds. That statistic understates the credit risk in bond portfolios if the portfolios contain bonds of disperse credit ratings. We explained that portfolio managers wanting to increase their yields could adjust their holdings to increase the credit risk investors were exposed to without increasing the risk signaled by the average credit quality statistic.
Introduction
Fund companies and portfolio managers can increase their revenues, profits and bonuses by reporting higher returns than their peers since net investor flows into mutual funds follow past performance within a peer group. Chevalier and Ellison [1997] and Sirri and Tufano [1998] . within a peer group by spreading their bond holdings across credit ratings to take on more risk while leaving the reported average credit risk unchanged. 3 Portfolio managers can also increase their reported yields within a term category although doing so requires more than just gaming a widely accepted but flawed statistic.
In what follows we document examples of long term bond funds falsely marketed as ultra short-and short-term bond funds. Some funds reduced their portfolio's sensitivity to general levels of risk free interest rates to levels consistent with ultra short-term and short-term bonds using interest rate swaps or by holding mostly floating rate bonds but kept the credit risk of their long term bond portfolios un-hedged. We show that this strategy retained substantial credit risk and allowed some funds to report higher returns than their peers in 2002-2006 but caused the funds to suffer large losses in 2008 as credit spreads on their long term bonds increased significantly.
In 2001, the SEC adopted a Final Rule specifically on how mutual funds were to describe themselves. 
Names and Average Weighted Portfolio Maturity and Duration
Investment companies investing in debt obligations often seek to distinguish themselves by limiting the maturity of the instruments they hold. These investment companies may call themselves, for example, "short-term," "intermediate-term," or "long-term" bond or debt funds. Historically, the Division of Investment Management has required investment companies with these types of names to have average weighted portfolio maturities of specified lengths. In particular, the Division has required an investment company that included the words "short-term," "intermediate-term," or "long-term" in its name to have a dollar-weighted average maturity of, respectively, no more than 3 years, more than 3 years but less than 10 years, or more than 10 years. Although the Proposing Release stated that the Division did not intend to continue to use these criteria, the Division has re-evaluated this position in light of its subsequent experience and the comments received on the Proposing Release. The Division has concluded that it will continue to apply these maturity criteria to investment companies that call themselves "short-term," "intermediate-term," or "long-term" because they provide reasonable constraints on the use of those terms.
We note, however, that there may be instances where the average weighted maturity of an investment company's portfolio securities may not accurately reflect the sensitivity of the company's share prices to changes in interest rates. The Commission and the Division, therefore, do not intend compliance with the Division's maturity guidelines to act as a safe harbor in determining whether a name is misleading. In a case, for example, where an investment company's name was consistent with the Division's maturity guidelines, but the "duration" of the company's portfolio was inconsistent with the sensitivity to interest rates suggested by the company's name, the name may be misleading (footnotes omitted).
The central thesis of our paper is that the mutual fund industry has sold bond portfolios with weighted average maturities greater than 20 years as "ultra short-term" and "short-term" despite the SEC's clear guidance that these terms can only be applied to funds with average maturities of less than three years.
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Alternative measures of the length of a bond
The "term" of a bond -how far distant in the future investors in bonds or bond portfolios receive cash flows -matters because the market value of a bond, other things equal, is lower and more sensitive to general levels of interest rates, credit risk and liquidity risk the longer the bond's term. $1,000 to be received in 20 years is worth less than $1,000 to be received in 10 years from the same issuer and the value of the 20-year bond will be more sensitive to changes in the creditworthiness of the issuer and the general level of interest rates than the 10-year bond.
An investor in bonds maturing in three months will not suffer significant losses if risk free interest rates, market-wide credit spreads or liquidity risk premiums increaseeven if they increase substantially, because, unless the specific issuer defaults, the investor will receive the face value of the bond in three months. An investor in bonds maturing in thirty years on the other hand will suffer significant losses if market-wide credit spreads or liquidity risk premiums increase even if the term structure of risk free interest rates is unchanged. 5 The second paragraph makes clear that the SEC maturity guidelines do not establish a safe harbor in cases where complying with the rule would be misleading and reference the Piper Jaffray case from the early 1990s. The maturity of a bond is the date by which the issuer commits to fully repay the principal or face value of the bond. Maturity is an unambiguous concept for nonamortizing bonds since all the principal is paid out on one date. The principal of an amortizing bond, on the other hand, is paid off over time and the maturity date is the date when the last principal payment is made. The weighted average life ("WAL") of a bond is the average time to repayment of principal. The WAL will be less than the maturity for an amortizing bond and equal to the maturity for a non-amortizing bond. floating rate bonds. Option-adjusted or "effective" duration was developed to capture the sensitivity of bonds to changes in the general level of the term structure of risk free or near risk free interest rates. To calculate effective duration, the term structure of interest rates is shifted up and down, deterministically or by simulation, and changes in the bond's value are observed after taking into account changes in the bond's likely period cash flows. Roughly speaking, effective duration is the ratio of the change in the bond's value to the simulated change in risk free interest rates.
Effective duration was an important tool for assessing the interest rate risk in agency collateralized mortgage obligations ("CMOs") because changes in the level of risk free interest rates caused cash flows to increase or decrease as homeowners adjusted their prepayment behavior to changes in interest rates. Also the interest rate sensitivity of CMOs was extremely sensitive to whether the securities had coupons that floated directly or inversely with interest rates.
While effective duration was an improvement on Macaulay duration for securities that have embedded options and have no credit risk like agency CMOs, it assumes the bonds have no credit risk and so is not a useful measure of risk for bonds with credit risk.
Of particular importance to our current research, the following three bonds have the same effective duration as that statistic is reported by mutual funds even though the 30-year bonds are orders of magnitude more risky than the 3-month bond. 1) 30-year, A-rated floating-rate bond; 2) 30-year, A-rated fixed-rate bond paired with an interest rate swap; and 3) 3-month, A-rated bond.
While effective duration measures the sensitivity of changes in bond values to changes in a benchmark or reference interest rate typically LIBOR or Treasury yields, it ignores changes in interest rates caused by deviations from the reference interest rate.
Spread duration measures the sensitivity of a bond's value to changes in yield spreads.
Changes in yield spreads arise because of changes in the credit risk and liquidity risk of the bond under examination. To calculate spread duration, a term structure of yield spreads is shifted up and down and changes in the bond's value are calculated. Spread duration is the ratio of the change in the bond's value to the simulated change in yield spreads and will roughly equal the traditional modified duration. There were no coinciding widespread defaults by issuers of the bonds which were held in the funds and so losses should have been essentially non-existent as the short-term bonds matured and were redeemed at par. Even on a mark-to-market basis the losses should have been extremely small as the coupon payments exceeded the temporarily and only slightly reduced market value of short-term bonds. Nonetheless many ultra shortterm and short-term bond funds lost more than 20% of their value. These losses occurred because of widening credit spreads on the ultra long-term bonds in the funds. is each fund's total return in 2008, 1 is the fund's weighted average maturity, 2 is the percentage of the fund's portfolio invested in government securities, 3 is the weighted average probability of default calculated from the reported distribution of credit Table 1 reports the regression output: The ultra short-term bond funds' total returns in 2008 are significantly negatively related to the weighted average maturity and the weighted average probability of default and significantly positively related to the amount invested in government securities but are uncorrelated with the effective duration reported by the mutual funds and used by Morningstar. The losses in ultra short-term bond funds in 2008 occurred because these funds were, in fact, long term bond funds and the greater the average maturity of their holdings and the greater the credit risk of those holdings, the greater were the losses suffered by investors who were told they were buying ultra short-term bond funds.
Short-term fund analysis
We have performed a similar analysis for short-term bond funds. Figure 3 illustrates the same wide variation in average maturities among self described short-term bonds funds as we saw for the ultra short-term bond funds. Our regression analysis of the short-term bond funds' total returns in 2008 parallels our results for the ultra short-term bond funds. The short-term funds' returns are significantly negatively related to the weighted average maturity and the amount invested in government securities but unrelated to the effective duration reported by the mutual funds and used by Morningstar. As with the ultra short-term funds, the losses in the short-term bond funds occurred because many of these funds were actually long-term bond funds. The greater the average maturity of their holdings, the greater were the losses suffered by investors who were told they were buying short-term bond funds. On its website, the SEC tells investors:
"Ultra-Short Bond Funds: Know Where You're Parking Your Money Ultra-short bond funds are mutual funds that generally invest in fixed income securities with extremely short maturities, or time periods in which they become due for payment." There is no ambiguity in the SEC's definition yet the average maturity of the 43 funds classified by Morningstar as "ultra short term" in early 2008 ranged from 1.8 years 7 www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/869365/000095013407022637/f32306nvcsr.htm at p. 6. 8 www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/844150/000115697304001031/u47856b5e424b5.htm at S-10. 9 http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ultra-short_bond_funds.htm
